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1. Introduction
In this essay, I argue that Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection against epistemic contextualism (EC) 
does  not  hold,  that  ‘know(s)’ is  context-sensitive  and that  there  is  a  potential  error  theory for 
epistemic contextualism.
The argument unfolds in two parts: after some introductory remarks (sections 2&3), I first 
critically assess the recent discussion of Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection (section 4) and show 
that it rests on a confusion that can be avoided by making a previously unstated distinction (section 
5). In the second part, I showcase a model for the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ (section 6) and 
sketch out a pragmatic approach to the error theory required by EC (section 7).
2. Epistemic Contextualism: everyday cases and skeptical puzzles
EC is the semantic thesis that ‘know(s)’ is a context-sensitive term.1 Thus, the content or the truth-
conditions of knowledge attributions (‘S knows that p’, S being some subject, p some proposition) 
vary across contexts. What is true in a low standard context (e.g. pub), may be false in a high 
standard context (e.g. philosopher’s conference). The epistemic standards are determined by the 
context. The context is conceived as the context of utterance and refers to features of the attributor’s 
psychology.2
EC is  primarily  motivated  by everyday cases  that  involve  so-called  ‘shifty  data’.3 Let’s 
consider an example: 
A: I know that is a zebra.
B: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
A: I guess I can’t rule that out.
B: So you admit that you don’t know that’s a zebra, and so you were wrong earlier?
A: Oh, c’mon. I didn’t say I know it’s a zebra.4
The last sentence strikes us as blatantly false because it contradicts sentence one. EC prevents A 
from saying something contradictory by claiming that ‘know(s)’ is context-sensitive and that there 
is a context shift in the course of the conversation. The standards in play at the beginning of the 
dialogue are not the same as those in the end. Since the standards rise, what is true in the beginning 
may be false in the end. A is not to blame: she is simply  ignorant of the context-sensitivity of 
‘know(s)’. There is no contradiction, since the first and the last sentence have different contents. 
She needn’t retract her initial statement.
Furthermore, EC claims that skeptical arguments resemble the example above.5 Hence, the 
puzzles they generate can be analyzed and resolved analogically.6
1  I will use the terms ‘context-sensitivity’ and ‘indexicality’ interchangeably. I know that this is controversial, cf. 
MacFarlane 2007
2  I refer to a generic account of EC that does not distinguish between content and truth context-sensitivity. 
Moreover, Rysiew 2007 writes that ‘context’ may additionally refer to the ‘conversational-practical situation’. The 
literature I used for this essay does not do that. So I won’t conceive ‘context’ in that fashion.
3  DeRose 1999: 194
4  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 33
5  EC has focused on arguments for external world skepticism. However, Neta 2003: 398 points out that 
probably all skeptical templates prey on the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’.
6  See DeRose 1999 for a detailed account.
5
3. Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection
EC’s solution to the skeptical puzzle does not come cheap, though. To establish the positive claim 
that ‘know(s)’ is a context-sensitive term, EC has to subscribe to a negative claim. The negative 
claim  consists  in  an  error  theory  that  explains  why competent  speakers  systematically  fail  to 
recognize the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ and get puzzled by the skeptic’s argument. 
Basically,  EC’s  error  theory  postulates  that  speakers  get  ‘bamboozled  by  [their]  own 
words’.7 Put differently, speakers are afflicted by some sort of ‘semantic blindness’8 to the context-
sensitivity of ‘know(s)’. 
EC’s error theory seems hardly satisfactory, though. As Stephen Schiffer (1996) objects, we 
do not fail to detect the context-sensitivity of ordinary context-sensitive terms, say indexicals like 
demonstratives (e.g. ‘that’).9 Thus, context-sensitivity may be assumed to be a transparent semantic 
feature. So, EC’s claim that there is hidden context-sensitivity contradicts this linguistic data.
However,  Schiffer’s  error-theoretical  objection  is  in  need  of  refinement.  For  it  remains 
unclear against what the objection is directed. Two different kinds of speaker’s ignorance might be 
targeted: either speakers being ignorant of the content of their utterances or them being ignorant of 
what their communicative intentions are.10
4. How to get it wrong: the problems of inaccessible content and mistaken 
intention
The specification reduces Schiffer’s objection to two problems: the problem of inaccessible content 
(that speakers cannot know what propositions they express) and the problem of mistaken intention 
(that speakers are mistaken about their own communicative intentions). 
A good deal of the contributions to the debate have focused on resolving one or both of these 
problems in order to refute or invigorate Schiffer’s objection. In this section, I critically assess three 
contributions and show how they fail  to resolve the problems. Their  failure indicates that  they 
somehow misconceive Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection. The misconception will be specified in 
section five.
Thomas  Hofweber  (1999)  sets  out  to  devise  a  model  for  the  context-sensitivity  of  ‘know(s)’. 
Thereby,  he  adopts  a  rough  propositional  approach  to  sentences  or  utterances  that  features 
unarticulated  constituents.  Unarticulated  constituents  are  conceived  as  functional  parts  of  the 
proposition that do not appear  explicitly at the sentential level. In fact, they commonly occur in 
cases  of  implicit  relativity. Adjectives  like  ‘tall’ exhibit  implicit  relativity,  since  they  have  an 
unarticulated constituent which refers to a comparison class. Although implicit,  the reference is 
cognitively accessible to the speaker.11
A second type of unarticulated constituents lacks this property, though. Hofweber calls it 
hidden  relativity and  considers  it  to  account  for  the  hidden  context-sensitivity  of  ‘know(s)’ 
advocated by EC. 
Hofweber offers the following example for hidden relativity: we often utter sentences like 
‘my car moves at  25 mph’,  treating physical  motion as an absolute  property.  Thanks to recent 
discoveries in physics, however,  we know that motion is a relative property.  The motion of an 
object can be measured only in relation to some framework of reference. Thus, the sentence features 
an unarticulated constituent we are unaware of.12
7  Schiffer 1996: 329
8  Metaphor coined by Hawthorne 2004: 107
9  Schiffer 1996: 326f.
10  Rysiew 2001: 483
11  Hofweber 1999: 4
12  Hofweber 1999: 10f.
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Unfortunately for EC, there is dissimilarity between this instance of hidden relativity and the 
‘hidden  relativity’  allegedly  at  work  in  knowledge  attributions.  In  the  case  of  motion,  the 
unarticulated  constituent  is  invariant,  the  framework  of  reference  being  some commonsensical 
understanding of motion as an absolute property. Although speakers cannot strictly speaking access 
the content of their utterances, it does not matter, since the unarticulated constituent unknown to 
almost everyone is also the same for everyone.13 Were hidden relativity an adequate model for the 
context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’, the situation would differ:  since the unarticulated constituent is 
some  variant feature  of  the  context,  the  content  changes  across  contexts.  When  it  comes  to 
accessing  contents,  speakers  fail  altogether.  Consequently,  they  become  unaware  of  sameness, 
difference  and  incompatibility  of  contents.14 But  obviously,  that  contradicts  linguistic  data  and 
renders the hidden relativity approach to the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ inadequate. Hofweber 
gets stuck with the problem of inaccessible content.
Unlike  Hofweber,  Patrick  Rysiew  (2001)  does  not  particularly  care  about  the  problem  of 
inaccessible content. He grants EC the inaccessibility of content, but emphasizes the implications: 
since content and context are closely tied on EC’s account, denying accessibility of content implies 
that speakers are systematically mistaken about their communicative intentions as well.  It simply 
proves impossible to hold track of the context if one loses the content.15 Even if EC found a solution 
to the problem of inaccessible content, it would not prevent EC from falling prey to the problem of 
mistaken intentions.
Ram Neta (2003) faces the challenge set up by Rysiew. He tries to give a solution to the problem of 
mistaken intention by biting the bullet and admitting that we can be partially mistaken about our 
communicative intentions.  Moreover, this does not harm our communication capacity, as Rysiew 
suggests. 
To make sense of Neta’s argument, we should return to Hofweber. As we have seen, there is 
a significant difference between Hofweber’s hidden relativity and the hidden context-sensitivity of 
‘know(s)’.  One might wonder, however, whether Hofweber’s hidden relativity case really is that 
unproblematic. After all, it contains inaccessible contents. And according to Schiffer, it is a general 
truth  about  language  that  the  content  of  an  utterance  has  to  be  backed  up  by  speaker’s 
communicative intentions.16 But how can you back up a content you cannot access? It seems to end 
in mistaken intentions, regardless of the unarticulated constituents being invariant. 
Hofweber’s  response  to  this  problem  is  the  application  of  his  propositional  model  of 
unarticulated constituents  to  mental  states,  such as  communicative  intentions.  Since the  mental 
unarticulated constituent is invariant in genuine instances of hidden relativity, no further problems 
whatsoever arise. Or so he argues.17
Basically,  Neta  gives  a  Hofweberian  theory  of  unarticulated  mental  constituents  for 
contextual features. He argues that there is indeed evidence for some unarticulated constituent on 
the mental level.18 But unlike in Hofweber’s application, the unarticulated constituent is a variant, 
contextual feature, namely some communicative intention, since context for EC is the attributor’s 
psychology. Put differently, there are communicative intentions we can be mistaken about, but that 
does not harm EC’s case for the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’! Let’s have a closer look at how 
Neta establishes the first claim – and why we need not bother having a closer look at the second.
13  Hofweber’s example is far from uncontroversial. Let’s grant it for the sake of the argument.
14  Hofweber 1999: 16
15  Rysiew 2001: 485
16  Hofweber 1999: 8f.
17  Hofweber 1999: 14. It is irrelevant whether Hofweber’s application really works. I need it only to establish the 
claim (introduced below) that Neta pursues the same line of argument.
18  Neta 2003: 404f.
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Firstly, Neta claims that there are communicative intentions we are unaware of and, hence, 
can be mistaken about. To illustrate his point, he considers a situation of disagreement that allegedly 
exhibits the confusion found in skeptical puzzles:
“Two people who think they are in the same room but are in fact in different rooms [and] are talking 
to each other over an intercom [will] mean something different by 'this room' when one claims 
'Frank is not in this room' and the other insists 'Frank is in this room – I can see him!' ”19
According to Neta, the two people are at the same time mistaken and not mistaken about their 
respective  communicative  intentions.  On  the  one  hand,  they  mistakenly  believe  their 
communicative intentions to be directed at an incompatible content, although the content cannot be 
truly incompatible.  Incompatibility presupposes sameness of content,  which is not given in this 
case, because the demonstrative ‘this’ gets assigned a different contextual value for each speaker. 
On the other hand, they are not mistaken about their communicative intentions, since '...each knows 
something about her own communicative intentions, but she doesn't know the whole truth about her 
own communicative intentions. Specifically,  she doesn't know what  inferential relation her own 
intended content bears to the other's intended content.'20 This specific ignorance results from the 
ignorance about the non-semantic fact that both speakers are not in the same room.21 Conversely, it 
is the ignorance about the non-semantic fact that results in a  partial ignorance about one’s own 
communicative intentions. Thus, we can be mistaken about communicative intentions.
Secondly, Neta claims that partial ignorance does not harm EC’s case for the context-sensitivity 
of ‘know(s)’. Thereby, he devises an argument for minimal conversational rationality: we do not 
need total access to our communicative intentions in order to participate rationally in conversation.
However,  we  need  not  evaluate  this  second  claim,  since  Neta’s  first  claim  fails  to  be 
consistent. In fact, I think it is essentially flawed when it treats the self-ignorance featured in the 
Frank-case as related to the semantic blindness afflicting speakers in skeptical cases. Here is why:22
In the Frank-case it is an ignored non-semantic feature of the context that leaves the two 
interlocutors  puzzled  (and  explains  their  confusion  to  us).  It  is  not the  partial  ignorance  of 
communicative intentions in the first place. Rather, the ignorance of the non-semantic fact induces 
the partial confusion about the communicative intentions. Analogically, in the skeptical case, Neta 
could not postulate partially mistaken communicative intentions (induced by the context-sensitivity 
of ‘know(s)’ and the ignorance of the context alone) and go on to launch an argument for minimal 
conversational rationality. He could not do it without introducing some non-semantic fact first.
On closer  examination,  Neta  commits  a  fallacy of  equivocation:  in  the  Frank-case,  the 
‘context’ (we are partially ignorant of) encompasses a non-semantic or non-psychological fact (that 
the  two persons  are  located  in  different  rooms),  whereas the  ‘context’ in  the  skeptical  case  is 
supposed to be a much narrower notion, merely including the attributor’s psychology. 
Since Neta cannot apply the solution worked out for the Frank-case to the skeptical case, his 
argument  breaks  down between the  claim of  partially mistaken intention and the  argument  for 
minimal  conversational  rationality.  His  failure  renders  the  whole  hidden  relativity  approach 
implausible at last. 
19  Neta 2003: 400. The example was originally devised by DeRose 1992. Rysiew 2001 comments on it to 
expound the problem of mistaken intention.
20  Neta 2003: 405
21  Neta 2003: 406
22  For brevity’s sake, I cannot discuss Neta’s explanation of skeptical puzzles. This is not needed anyway: what 
is at stake is Neta’s application of his solution to the Frank-case to skeptical puzzles.
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5. How to get it right: the distinction between indexicality and intelligibility 
The  line  of  argument  pursued  by  Hofweber,  Rysiew  and  Neta  fails  because  it  misconceives 
Schiffer’s  error-theoretical  objection.  More  precisely,  it  conflates  the  distinction  between  the 
indexicality  of  ‘know(s)’ and  the  intelligibility  of  this  particular  indexicality.  Accordingly,  two 
separate philosophical endeavors were run together: the quest for an adequate model of context-
sensitivity for ‘know(s)’, and the pursuit  of an explanation as to why the context-sensitivity of 
‘know(s)’ remains unintelligible to us in skeptical cases.
I think that the conflation roots in Hofweber’s notion of hidden relativity. For it unsuccessfully tries 
to explain the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ by emphasizing its cognitive inaccessibility. Even 
Neta’s  much more  sophisticated  argument  is  pervaded by this  idea  that  unintelligibility  should 
somehow account for context-sensitivity. 
Fortunately, the issues are not that closely tied. EC’s positive and negative claim can be treated 
separately.  Adjusting one does  not  mean to  lose the other.  A separate  treatment  might  even be 
required in order to comprehensively explain knowledge attributions.
Therefore, on my reading, Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection raises two questions which can be 
answered independently.
(i.) Which semantic model does best explain the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’? 
(ii.) Which pragmatic model governs the intelligibility of this particular context-sensitivity? 
In the second part, I attempt to answer these questions by presenting Michael Blome-Tillmann’s 
analysis of the indexicality of ‘know(s)’ and by putting forward some reflections on the pragmatics 
of knowledge attributions.
6. A model for the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2008) puts forward a model for the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ that 
might  be  taken  as  a  convincing  answer  to  the  first  question.  He  claims  that  ‘know(s)’ is  a 
linguistically  exceptional  term,  for  it  features  a  special  combination  of  semantic,  syntactic  and 
pragmatic properties. More precisely, ‘know(s)’ proves to be indexical and factive, non-gradable 
and functioning as the epistemic norm of assertion.23 The unique nature of ‘know(s)’ would also 
partly explain the difficulties we face in detecting its context-sensitivity.
For reasons of brevity,  I  will  just  present  his  argument  for the indexicality of ‘know(s)’ which 
coincides (not  coincidentally) with the refutation of  the error-theoretical  objection.  Two further 
objections that establish the properties of non-gradability as well as factivity and normativity of 
assertion,  respectively, cannot be addressed here. Moreover, the argument for the indexicality of 
‘know(s)’ will not be assessed critically. 
The aim of this section is to showcase one specific feature of a recent indexicalist approach 
which can accommodate most of the criticism directed at EC so far. 
Blome-Tillmann’s  argument  for  the  indexicality  of  ‘know(s)’  runs  as  follows:  on  closer 
examination,  the indexicality of ‘know(s)’ is  no more obscure than the indexicality of gradable 
adjectives like ‘flat’. Both of them may violate the ‘transparency requirement’ Schiffer holds for 
ordinary indexicals. Imagine the following dialogue:24
23  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 52
24  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 36
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A: That meadow is flat.
B: But have you considered there are some molehills in it? 
A: I guess I haven’t.
B: So you admit that meadow isn’t flat, and so you were wrong earlier?
A: Oh, c’mon! I didn’t say that the meadow is flat.
Intuitively, the last sentence seems false, because we fail to spot the indexicality of ‘flat’ right away. 
But  our  initial  confusion  can  be  straightened out  by applying so-called  ‘degree modifiers’ like 
‘completely’. Compare: 25
A: That meadow is flat.
B: But have you considered there are some molehills in it? 
A: I guess I haven’t.
B: So you admit that meadow isn’t flat, and so you were wrong earlier?
A: Oh, c’mon! I didn’t say that the meadow is completely flat.
Now we realize that A’s first and last sentences are not really contradictory. And, as it turns out, the 
same can be done for ‘know(s)’. Recall the zebra-case above:
A: I know that is a zebra.
B: But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
A: I guess I can’t rule that out.
B: So you admit that you don’t know that’s a zebra, and so you were wrong earlier?
A: Oh, c’mon. I didn’t say I know it with absolute certainty.26
Presumably, we do not usually talk like this, but that may have reasons other than the context-
sensitivity of ‘know(s)’.27 What matters is that the modifier phrase applied reminds us of the two 
epistemic standards at stake. And that the content of ‘know(s)’ varies accordingly.
After having considered such and similar cases, Blome-Tillmann derives the following manual for 
EC’s handling of error-theoretical objections: First, one needs to construe parallel problem cases for 
gradable adjectives. Second, one smoothens those examples containing apparent contradictions by 
inserting modifier expressions.28
Sure, this semantic model for the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ is just one side of the coin. 
The finding that ‘know(s)’ is a unique expression with certain linguistic properties does not yet fully 
explain our systematic failure to recognize its context-sensitivity.  But it gives us a hint: since the 
context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ is semantic, we are not afflicted by semantic blindness. Rather, the 
lack of intelligibility must enter on the pragmatic level of knowledge attributions. Therefore, let’s 
have a closer look at the pragmatics of knowledge attributions.29
25  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 39
26  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 39f.
27  Presumably, the reasons are ‘know(s)’’s being factive and the epistemic norm of assertion. Cf. Blome-
Tillmann: 48 f.
28  Blome-Tillmann 2008: 41. Obviously, Blome-Tillmann holds that gradable adjectives are context-sensitive. 
That’s not universally agreed.
29  Semantic blindness is not the only term we should ban from our vocabulary. A ‘particular model of context-
sensitivity for ‘know(s)’ seems a candidate as well. After all, ‘know(s)’ is simply indexical. Its special linguistic 
behavior is due to its combination with other semantic, syntactic and pragmatic features.
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7. Intelligibility and context
A generic approach to the pragmatics of knowledge attributions could look like this: basically, two 
types of context are operative in knowledge attributions. There is not only the attributor’s context, 
but also the shared ‘conversational score’ between the attributor and (an)other interlocutor(s). The 
‘conversational score’ could be modeled roughly in Lewisian terms: it manages all the information 
relevant to a conversation and makes it available to the participants.30 Misunderstandings occur if 
we no longer share the same score.
Accordingly, ‘know(s)’ gets its contextual values assigned in two different stages. The epistemic 
standards may be determined by the attributor’s psychology alone. Additionally, however, there is a 
parameter  on the ‘conversational  scoreboard’ that  determines  whether  the  context-sensitivity of 
‘know(s)’ is intelligible to the speakers or not. Let’s call it the intelligibility parameter. 
Presumably, the intelligibility parameter does not only exist for the context-sensitivity of 
‘know(s)’. After all, ‘know(s)’ features the same context-sensitivity as any other, ordinary context-
sensitive term. If this is true, their difference in intelligibility can be explained as follows:
In the case of an ordinary indexical like a personal pronoun, the mechanism is comparably simple 
because  of  two  reasons:  the  context-sensitive  expression  at  stake  does  not  feature  exceptional 
linguistic  properties,  and,  if  intelligibility  is  a  parameter  on  the  scoreboard,  there  will  be  an 
according  rule  of  accommodation.  A rule  of  accommodation  serves  the  purpose  of  keeping  a 
conversation  alive  by  adjusting  apparently  incorrect  linguistic  behavior.31 So  does  the  rule  of 
accommodation for intelligibility: if the conversationalist ignores the context-sensitivity of a term, 
the rule assigns the contextual value that is most suitable for the current course of the conversation.
In the case of ‘know(s)’, things get slightly more complicated. First of all, we are dealing 
with a linguistically exceptional expression: ‘know(s)’ does not only feature the semantic property 
of being indexical, as indicated above. Rather, there are other features bound to interfere with the 
‘conversational scoreboard’.  Normally, I suppose, the ‘conversational scoreboard’ can handle the 
variety of parameters pretty well. And the rules of accommodation take care of the rest.
In  the  skeptical  case,  however,  there  seems  to  be  too  heavy  ‘pragmatic  traffic’ on  the 
scoreboard. As a consequence, we lose track of the intelligibility parameter. As a result, we become 
ignorant of the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’ and end up being puzzled by the skeptical case.32
Obviously, I try to make sense of Neta’s inconsistency. Not our communicative intentions, but the 
‘conversational score’ provides us with the non-semantic and non-psychological contextual feature 
ignored in the skeptical case. When we fail to detect the context-sensitivity of ‘know(s)’, we are 
simply ignorant of the intelligibility parameter.
Sure, the model put forward is but a sketch.  Nonetheless,  I  believe it  to have the potential  for 
explaining our ‘pragmatic blindness’ in respect to knowledge attributions. And even if solutions 
were not to be found in elaborating on my account, it highlights two areas on which proponents of 
EC should focus their philosophical efforts: First, EC needs to revise its notion of ‘context’, since it 
has proven to be too narrow. Second, EC needs to flesh out the pragmatics of knowledge attribution. 
Sure, EC is an essentially semantic thesis. But, as we have seen, it cannot refute criticism without 
making sense of some fundamentally pragmatic concepts.
30  Lewis 1979: 344ff.
31  Lewis 1979: 346f.
32  In detail, this process could be modeled after Lewis’ explanation of ‘relative modality’. Cf. Lewis 1979: 354f. 
Unfortunately, for reasons of brevity, I cannot discuss that here.
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8. Conclusion
In my essay, I have argued that Schiffer’s error-theoretical objection rests on a confusion that can be 
successfully  disentangled  by introducing  the  distinction  between  indexicality  and intelligibility. 
Consequently, I suggested that one treats the problems the distinction frames separately by devising 
a  semantic  model  for  the  context-sensitivity  of  ‘know(s)’  and  a  pragmatic  model  for  the 
intelligibility  of  its  context-sensitivity.  I  showcased  Blome-Tillmann’s  semantic  model  and 
advocated a pragmatic model that operates on two different notions of context, a psychological and 
a conversational one. 
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